Introduction
I first came across the Uyghurs in 1988 while studying Chinese in Beijing. Four years later, in June 1992, I returned to the city and had an interesting conversation with a young Uyghur migrant worker. Under cover of darkness, he informed me that Uyghurs were being provided with bombs "from the outside" with which they would fight the Han Chinese. August 1991 had seen the break-up of the former USSR and the establishment of independent Central Asian states adjacent to Xinjiang. Following these significant events, there was much talk of the so-called "contamination effect"
(the idea that independence movements in former Soviet Central Asia might spread across the border into Xinjiang).
i News from the outside world had been flooding into Xinjiang since its opening in the mid-eighties, and many Uyghurs had relatives in the newly independent states. Western observers began to wonder what would be the effect on the Uyghur cousins on the Chinese side of the border. It was in this context and climate that I decided to go to Xinjiang to research modern Uyghur identities.
One year was spent in the region between September 1995 and September 1996 conducting fieldwork among Uyghurs in the regional capital of Ürümchi in the north, and in the southern oases of Kucha, Aqsu, Qäšqär, and Xotän. Determined to gather information "straight from the horse's mouth," I adopted an ethnographic approach to research and spent the first six months in the field learning basic Uyghur so that I might converse with respondents in their mother tongue. The core of the empirical data comprises informal conversations with Uyghurs of both sexes, of various ages and social groups, and from various localities, in addition to qualitative observations of practices and interactions among Uyghurs and of interactions between Uyghurs, Han Chinese, and other minority nationalities in Xinjiang. In this respect, a basic assumption has been made that meanings are sustained in processes of social interaction.
I was aware that Uyghur identities had traditionally been diverse, depending on geographical area and social group. I therefore decided to select key informants from a number of different oases in the north and south, as well as from different walks of life. I also tried to choose an equal number of males and females, as well as
Uyghurs from different age groups. In addition to these key informants, I gathered supplementary data from one-off conversations with diverse individuals I met along the way. Key informants eventually included intellectuals, students, secondary school pupils, middle school teachers, petty entrepreneurs, unemployed people, a nurse, a prefectural Communist Party Secretary, and a number of peasants. They came from Ürümchi, from the oases of Kucha, Xotän, Qäšqär, Aqsu, Atuš, Ghulja, and Turpan, and also from the Aqsu countryside. For three months in summer 1996, I was fortunate enough to be able to conduct participant observation while living in several Uyghur homes.
The nature of the separatist movement in Xinjiang in the nineties
The Uyghur independence movement of the nineties is something of a new phenomenon. Since the late eighties and early nineties, Uyghur identity has experienced radical changes. This decade has seen both the rapid strengthening of the Uyghur national identity in urban areas and the development of its ethno-political element among certain social groups. Social and political instability in Xinjiang has to a certain extent mirrored growing unrest in Tibet since 1987. The protagonists of both movements hail from the younger generation and claim to be socially and economically disadvantaged compared with Han Chinese who have immigrated to their regions.
ii So far, separatist ideologies are more prolific in urban than in rural areas of Xinjiang, suggesting that the emergence and development of Uyghur ethnonationalism is, in part, linked to the steady increase in Han immigration to Xinjiang's towns over the past forty years. Modern Uyghur separatism also appears to have been fuelled by certain significant domestic and international events and trends.
Peaceful demonstrations in the late eighties against racial discrimination and socio-economic inequalities gave way first to rioting that coincided with the 1989 prodemocracy movement in China proper, iii and then to violent riots in south Xinjiang in the summer of 1990. The Baren riots, as they came to be known, began with a speech in a mosque, and culminated in a mass protest against CCP birth control policy, nuclear testing, and the export of natural resources. Since that time, the independence movement has gradually increased in militancy. In February 1992, some separatists turned to terrorism and carried out bomb attacks in Ürümchi, Ghulja, Xotän, Chöchäk, and Bortala. v Further bombs exploded in the region's towns during the years that followed. The increasing anxiety of the Chinese authorities concerning the step-up in Uyghur violence has been reflected in their political decisions as well as in CCP discourse in the nineties. Certain changes in policy were especially telling. In August 1990, and in the wake of the Baren riots, a meeting of editors in Lhasa decided to impose tighter control on the media. From this time on, factual reporting (previously often sympathetic to ethnic minorities) was replaced by properly vetted articles and editorials attacking separatism (Dillon 1995: 29 Some began to joke that although the Chinese government had once said that only socialism could save China, it now believed that only China could save socialism (Rudelson 1997: 14) . also "prepared to adapt or reform aspects of Islamic custom in accordance with political and social conditions" (Forbes 1986: 113-14) .
Reluctance of the elderly generation to return to chaos
Both the strengthening of the Uyghur national identity and the emergence of separatist ideologies in Xinjiang are the product of the aforementioned internal and external
factors. Yet although most urban Uyghurs presently maintain strong Uyghur national identities, not everybody subscribes to separatist views that have emerged during the late eighties and early nineties. In the following sections, I present portraits of four generations of Uyghurs in an effort to reveal their respective backgrounds and the contrastive nature of their present outlooks and attitudes towards the independence movement. Each description is an ideal-type construct, which stands only for "…a certain stylization, in which the characteristic, distinctive, or 'typical' elements are stressed" (Freund 1968: 62 (Forbes 1986 : 49, Maillart 1983 . Swedish explorer and scientist Sven Hedin (1936: 3-4) writes that Jin's rule was characterised by high taxes and customs, a monopoly on the furs and wool trade, the appropriation of land for Han Chinese, and the use of spies, who were placed everywhere: "Discontent increased; the people clenched their teeth and bided their time; the atmosphere was tense and gloomy. Inflammable matter accumulated, and only a spark was needed to fire the powder magazine."
Uyghurs were subjected to similar injustices under Tungan rule between 1934 and 1937. Far from joining ranks with their Muslim brothers, the Tungans ruled over the southern Tarim basin as a colony and remained loyal to the GMD government in Nanjing (Forbes 1986: 130-31) . xxxiv In Tunganistan, taxation was heavy in order to support the military while the needs of local people were neglected. Farmers and merchants were exploited for the benefit of the garrisons, and forced conscription was common. Hedin (1940: 3) mentions the bad reputation that Tungans had earned in Xinjiang at this time. He writes that his team of scientists picked up supplies from a local beg at Shinnega who "understood that we were distinguished people from Europe and China, and not savage Tungans, who looted at will and paid for nothing they took." xxxv By 1935, inflation was out of control, homesick Tungan troops were deserting, and local Uyghurs frequently fought with Tungan soldiers on the street.
Then, towards the end of 1937 and under the rule of the pro-Soviet Han warlord Sheng Shicai, Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples were plunged into a decade of ruthless political suppression (Forbes 1986: 151-161 
Revival of Uyghur identity among Uyghur Youth
The young generation, conversely, has grown up in an age of relative ethnic and religious tolerance. The young generation has grown up in an age of relative ethnic and religious freedom, has experienced a process of rapid re-traditionalisation across the region since 1980, and every day lives out the competitive "Us and Them" ethnic dichotomy that has developed between Uyghurs and Han Chinese in urban areas over the past two decades. The youth has also seen the 1989 pro-democracy movement in China, the collapse of Eastern Europe and the USSR, the formation of the independent CIS republics, and the burgeoning of Islamic fundamentalist movements world-wide. He also loses no opportunity to report incidents of Han religio-cultural or socio-economic discrimination against Uyghurs. He once described how the 1993
Forum for Talent Exchange (Rencai jiaoliuhui) held in Ürümchi had been cancelled halfway through after Han company representatives were accused of intending to employ only Han Chinese or Uyghurs whose first language was Chinese (minkaohan).
The authorities had allegedly shut the Forum down after students from Xinjiang University threatened to march in protest. Šöhrat also claimed that a limited number of entry passes for the same Forum in 1995 were sent out to selected companies and work units only (i.e., those that employed mainly Han Chinese). He nonetheless managed to obtain a pass and later reported that only one company stall had its details advertised in Uyghur script as well as Chinese. He further tested company attitudes towards Uyghurs by approaching a computing firm and offering his services, but claimed that he was rebuffed by representatives, who replied: "We hadn't considered
Uyghurs."
The latest strategy of Xinjiang's urban intellectuals is to achieve goals for Uyghurs by encouraging the young to penetrate the modern education system and thereby "play the Hans at their own game." Many feel that only through an increase in scientific knowledge, computing know-how, and foreign language ability will the young generation become strong enough to compete with and oppose the Han Author: Do you really believe that Xinjiang will be independent one day? Uyghur: Yes, I believe it! There isn't a single Uyghur in the whole of Xinjiang that doesn't believe it. Author: When do you think it will happen, then? Uyghur: In 1997. There is no way that England is really going to give Hong Kong back. Author: I wouldn't be so sure about that. Uyghur: Don't you think there will be a war, then?
In this way, many young Uyghur men seemed truly convinced (or perhaps wanted to believe) that England actually had no intention of returning Hong Kong to China, and that China and England would become embroiled in conflict. Such a development would weaken China's domestic defences so that Uyghurs would have a chance to break away. Ghäyrät, the kebab-seller, advanced a different theory (one also propounded by Chinese and Western political analysts) that China might one day split into five independent regions. He thought that both Tibet and Xinjiang would become independent at that time. I asked him what would happen to Xinjiang's Han immigrants in such an eventuality:
Author: So what happens to the Hans when Xinjiang secedes? Ghäyrät: I know what you're saying. The thing is, we don't want to kill anyone at the end of the day. We just want to be our own leaders. This is our land. We want them to give Xinjiang back to us. Author: And what would happen to all the Hans who now live in Xinjiang? Are you going to make them all leave? Ghäyrät: No. They can stay so long as they submit to our laws, new laws made by our leadership.
His words reflect the popular feeling that the majority of Uyghurs are basically passive and would prefer to win Xinjiang through diplomatic not warlike means.
Finally, there was the "Taiwan theory." If China were drawn into argument with the United States over the future of Taiwan, her attention might be diverted long enough for Uyghurs to instigate revolt.
Increasingly politicised attitudes among the youth
The arrest in 1996 of a large number of teenagers and Uyghurs in their early twenties suggested that the youth was becoming increasingly politicised and was the most likely among the four generations of Uyghurs to adopt separatist ideologies. lii There have been other signs that the Chinese authorities expect this teenage generation to be problematic. Repeated statements in the press in 1996 such as: "Religious activities are absolutely not allowed to infiltrate into ordinary schools, nor will anyone be allowed to instil national splittism ideology and religious creeds into students" suggested that such ideologies had already started to make inroads. Han Chinese shop assistants after they allegedly subjected him to racial abuse. He had subsequently been taken away by Han police and denied visits from his friends and family. Azatgül explained that she and her parents had attempted to take him some [uncle] . But the kid just turned around and hurled abuse at him! Live on TV!" Šöhrat believes that Uyghurs are in a transition period. He and his friends subscribe to the theory that, once the cautious older generations pass away and the youth grows up to raise its own children, Uyghurs will finally be united in nationalist spirit. This optimistic view, however, may be shared only by a small number of male urban intellectuals.
Conclusion: as Uyghurs come out of transition…
Supposing that the transition period theory comes to fruition, there remain many other problems that Uyghurs must solve if they are to pose a genuine challenge to the Chinese authorities. Although the young generation is twice as likely as its forefathers to adopt secessionist ideologies, it faces problems of disunity within its own ranks.
Over the next ten to fifteen years, it is likely that an increasing number of young, urban Uyghurs will be educated in Han Chinese schools. The decision to give a Uyghur child a Han Chinese education, and turn him or her into a minkaohan, brings with it as many disadvantages as advantages. While laying the foundation for a university education and better career and life prospects, a Han education also results in perceived cultural deficiencies. Adult minkaohan are often unable to read and write Uyghur script, are not completely fluent in spoken Uyghur, and feel themselves devoid of certain important elements of Uyghur cultural identity. These perceived deficiencies often lead to their ostracisation by minkaomins (literally "minorities examined in their own minority language," i.e., Uyghurs who attended Uyghur schools).
Would-be secessionists also face the challenge of winning the support of Xinjiang's women. Although many women in Xinjiang regret Han Chinese dilution of Uyghur culture in the past and maintain strong Uyghur national identities in the present, most nonetheless take a more practical (or perhaps cynical) attitude towards notions of independence. Räwiä, the French language specialist in Ürümchi, feels that secession is now an impossibility and that all Uyghurs can do is to concentrate on securing an egalitarian society: "OK, the Hans are here now, they can stay. But everyone must be equal. I can't hope for more. They didn't want to give up Taiwan, so we're never going to get this huge piece of land off them." Although Räwiä has a strong identity as a member of an ethnic group in competition with the Hans and is adamant that equal opportunities must be secured for Uyghurs, she (like many women in urban areas) nonetheless considers the separatist cause hopeless and impractical.
Uyghur men accordingly dub their women "pacifists" who think only of marriage, children, and the home, and exclude them from the largely male domain of political discussion. In so doing, they minimise the possibility of enlisting female support for the separatist cause.
Then there is the reality of the differing circumstances of urban and rural with China proper. According to Rudelson's (1997 Rudelson's ( : 9, 46) findings in 1989 Rudelson's ( -1990 many Turpanliqs had profited greatly from the grape industry since the early eighties and maintained healthy identities as Chinese citizens. As I was unable to conduct research in Turpan, it is uncertain whether this is still the case in the mid-to late nineties, although there have been no major uprisings in the eastern oases to date.
There is also a clash of political vision between Uyghurs in the north and south of the region. Like the rebels of the 1930s and 40s, many southerners still advocate the establishment of an "Eastern Turkestan" and continue to seek political support from Turkey, Afghanistan, and the Middle East. Yet in the north, a different pattern has emerged. Since the establishment of the independent republic of Qazaqstan, the Qazaqs of the northern prefectures have demanded variously: a) the right to leave Xinjiang and "return" to their motherland of Qazaqstan; b) that Xinjiang also becomes an independent CIS republic; and c) that Ili prefecture be merged with
Qazaqstan. Northern Uyghurs, on the other hand, have begun to call for the establishment of "Uyghuristan," a development that suggests that Uyghur identity is stronger than ever before. This choice of name does not bode well for the potential unification of Uyghurs, Qazaqs, and other minority nationalities in the north against Chinese rule. In the event that Xinjiang did achieve independence in the future, Uyghur chauvinism is likely to cause temporary alliances with other ethnic groups (in particular, the Qazaqs) to break down once more. Aliyä, a female postgraduate studying dentistry in Ürümchi, is one of many intellectuals to have rejected the old name "Eastern Turkestan" in favour of the new term based on the Uyghur ethnonym.
She explained: "I don't really like the term 'Eastern Turkestan.' That implies that the land still doesn't belong to us. We are not Turks any more. We are now quite different from them." Her words suggest that the Turkic identity has considerably weakened in the north.
Despite these numerous obstacles to Uyghur unity, there are signs that the independence movement has gained in popularity in the second half of the nineties.
While Rudelson concluded that in 1989 Rudelson concluded that in -1990 only Uyghur intellectuals subscribed to Uyghur nationalism, I found in 1995-1996 that three groups of urban Uyghurs had strong ethno-political aspirations: intellectuals, petty entrepreneurs, and the unemployed. Three years on, in 1999, it appears that Uyghur separatism not only has begun to spread from urban to rural areas, but has also spread to other social groups.
According to several reports released by Amnesty International in January 1999, Uyghurs have the people, and yet they lack the leader." lxii This paper suggests that over the next ten to fifteen years, Uyghur national identity is likely to strengthen further, especially among Uyghur youth.
